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Gorilla:  How Reconsideration of
Home Rule in Oregon Can Help
Metro Tame Measure 37
In 1968, Professor Kenneth Vanlandingham wrote that “homerule begins at home; no constitutional provision alone can as-
sure it.  If home rule is to become more meaningful, cities must
not only become more aggressive in exercising it, but they must
remain on the alert . . . to advance and protect their proper inter-
ests.”1  Ten years after Professor Vanlandingham penned his call
to arms, the Oregon Supreme Court gutted home rule as
Oregonians knew it.2  Home rule, which can be described as lim-
ited governance power that a state grants to its local govern-
ments, has raised many questions for state courts since Missouri
passed the country’s first home rule amendment in 1875.3  Fore-
most among these questions is:  Where does one draw the line
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2007; Editor-in-Chief, Or-
egon Law Review , 2006-07.  This Comment would not be here without Professor
Keith Aoki’s enthusiasm, guidance, and patience, for which I am immensely grate-
ful.  Thanks are also due to Caryn Ackerman for keeping me to task and Ben Hov-
land for his research assistance.  Finally, I thank Richard and Beverly Burgundy for
their unconditional support and encouragement.
1 Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States , 10 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 269, 314 (1968).
2 See  City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204
(1978).
3 See MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, § 16 (now MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a)); see,
e.g. , Sho Sato, “Municipal Affairs” in California , 60 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1066-75
(1972) (describing conflicting case law following passage of California’s home rule
amendment).
[815]
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between where state authority ends and local autonomy begins?
Or, to borrow Professor Vanlandingham’s phrasing, what should
a home rule city’s “proper interests” be?  For their part, Oregon
courts have swung dramatically between a narrow and broad in-
terpretation of the extent of its cities’ home rule power under
Oregon’s constitution, finally “settling” the law in City of La
Grande v. Public Employees Retirement Board .4  In La Grande ,
Justice Hans Linde wrote for the majority that when it comes to
substantive laws, state law presumptively trumps a conflicting lo-
cal rule or ordinance.5  Accordingly, localities’ home rule auton-
omy is limited to procedural matters where the state has no
substantive interest.6
Justice Thomas Tongue, in a lengthy and passionate dissent,
asked the million-dollar questions to the majority:  Could the
framers of Oregon’s home rule amendments have intended to
limit local power to purely local procedural matters?  Could past
decisions upholding local substantive laws be wrong?  In light of
past holdings and Oregon’s current needs, should home rule for
Oregon cities, counties, and regions be construed so narrowly?7
In light of Oregon’s recent passage of Measure 37, these are
some of the questions that Oregon’s local governments, specifi-
cally Metro, may want to ponder.  Oregon has a long, storied his-
tory of land use planning, seen by some as a model effort to
preserve the state’s natural beauty and farmland while encourag-
ing controlled growth within its metropolitan areas.8  In 1973, the
Oregon legislature made a finding that “[u]ncoordinated use of
lands within this state threatens the orderly development, the en-
vironment . . . and the health, safety, order, convenience, pros-
perity and welfare of the people.”9  Based in part on this finding,
the legislature adopted nineteen planning goals that local govern-
ments were required to implement.10
4 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204 (1978).
5 Id.  at 156, 576 P.2d at 1215.
6 Id.  at 156, 576 P.2d at 1215.
7 See id.  at 157-59, 576 P.2d at 1215-16 (Tongue, J., dissenting).
8 Paul Boudreaux, The Three Levels of Ownership:  Rethinking Our Restrictive
Homebuilding Laws , 37 URB. LAW. 385, 400 (2005).
9 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005(1) (2005).
10 Id. § 197.010.  For details on the nineteen planning goals, see the Oregon De-
partment of Land Conservation and Development web site, http://
www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).  Specifically, the
newest version of Goal 14 provides that “[u]rban growth boundaries shall be estab-
lished and maintained by cities, counties and regional governments to provide land
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A well-known example of a locality implementing these state
goals is Metro, a quasi-governmental regional body that man-
ages, among other things, land use in the Portland area through
maintenance of the urban growth boundary (UGB).11  In es-
sence, the UGB draws the line limiting how far Portland and its
suburbs may grow in a given period of time.  It designates land
within the UGB for development and other city planning needs
and designates land outside the UGB as farmland or other
nondevelopable parcels.12  Across the country, urban planners
have credited Metro with creating a smart-growth model that has
minimized sprawl and created one of the best-planned cities in
the nation.13
However, Oregon’s land use regime has also prompted loud
criticism from those who see the state’s regulations and Metro’s
implementation of them as a blatant infringement on private
landowners’ rights.  Specifically, some critics contend that the
UGB has visually divided the apparent “haves”—those who can
realize higher value for their land—and the “have-nots”—those
limited to unprofitable and untenable land uses.14  As such, land-
owners’ longstanding frustration with Oregon’s land use regime
took form in Measure 37, a 2004 voter initiative providing that
when a land use provision results in a decrease in private prop-
erty value, the regulatory body must supply compensation or
waive the provision.15  The sixty-one percent of voters16 who sup-
for urban development needs and to identify and separate urban and urbanizable
land from rural land.” OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000(14) (2006), available at http://
www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal14.pdf, at 1.
11 See Metro Home Page, http://www.metro-region.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
12 See  Metro, Urban Growth Boundary, http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?
ArticleID=277 (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
13 See generally CARL ABBOTT, GREATER PORTLAND: URBAN LIFE AND LAND-
SCAPE IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 129-98 (2001) (providing a history of metropoli-
tan planning in Portland); Heike Mayer & John Provo, The Portland Edge in
Context , in THE PORTLAND EDGE 9, 9-10 (Connie P. Ozawa ed., 2004) (describing
Portland’s urban landscape).
14 See, e.g. , Elisabeth Hagans, Letter to the Editor, OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar.
5, 2006, at E3 (noting that her “farmland” is unfarmable and next to multimillion-
dollar housing developments).  Bill Moshofsky of Oregonians in Action, infra  note
15, compared the UGB to the “Berlin Wall” and stated that as a result of the UGB, R
“[p]roperty rights have been swept under the rug. . . . [H]igh density is going to
reduce the quality of life.  People will be crowded together, living on small lots.  The
land supply will be so limited that housing costs will become unaffordable.”  Alan
Katz, Developing the Future , DENVER POST, Feb. 10, 1997, at A1.
15 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005); see infra  Appendix.  Oregonians in Action, a
nonprofit group devoted to fighting “excessive” land use regulations, authored Mea-
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ported Measure 37 dropped an eight-hundred-pound gorilla on
Metro’s doorstep, leaving it with the Hobson’s choice of either
compensating land owners from unspecified or nonexistent funds
or waiving the applicable land use provisions.  Since waiver is the
only real choice left to Metro, its carefully constructed and main-
tained UGB could collapse into urban sprawl, thanks to Measure
37.
Metro may not have to give the gorilla everything it wants,
however.  This Comment posits that Metro can provide a com-
pelling answer to Professor Vanlandingham’s call to arms by ar-
guing for a reinterpretation of its home rule powers in a way that
would ultimately neutralize Measure 37.  Metro can achieve this
by looking back to the home rule amendment’s text, history, and
framers’ intent, along with the infirmities in La Grande .  For in-
troductory purposes, Part I provides background on the origins
of Oregon’s home rule amendment, including a brief look at the
national movement to adopt home rule through state amend-
ments and the debates surrounding these amendments.  Part II
discusses the ninety-plus-year debate in Oregon courts over what
powers home rule provides local governments.  In Part III, this
Comment explores the origins of Metro and its current structure.
It also examines Measure 37, its applicable provisions, and how
Metro and the Oregon Supreme Court have responded to these
provisions.  Finally, based on the intent of the home rule amend-
ment framers, Oregon case law, and the nature and needs of met-
ropolitan land use planning, Part IV argues that a reevaluation of
the rule in La Grande  and a rethinking of Oregon’s home rule
amendment could permit Metro’s home rule powers to expand
beyond mere procedural matters and supersede Measure 37’s
requirements.
I
THE ORIGINS OF HOME RULE IN OREGON
Although it is a frequently used term, “home rule” cannot be
boiled down to one simple definition.17  As the National League
of Cities describes it:
sure 37. See Oregonians in Action, Background Information, http://www.oia.org/
oia2.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
16 See  Or. Sec’y of State Election Div., General Election Official Results, Nov. 2,
2004, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf.
17 See  Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule:  A
Role for the Courts , 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644-46 (1964).
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[H]ome rule is a delegation of power from the state to its sub-
units of governments (including counties, municipalities,
towns or townships, or villages).  That power is limited to spe-
cific fields, and subject to constant judicial interpretation.
Home rule creates local autonomy and limits the degree of
state interference in local affairs.18
In his often-cited 1964 law review article, Professor Terrance
Sandalow described home rule as “a grant of power to the electo-
rate of a local government unit to frame and adopt a charter of
government.”19  In broad terms, a home rule grant from a state
bestows autonomy to local governments to manage local matters.
Further, like other legal concepts, home rule may be used as a
sword or shield.  When a local government undertakes acts pur-
suant to a grant of statutory or constitutional home rule power,
that locality is using home rule as a sword, asserting what is
called home rule initiative.20  In contrast, local governments may
use home rule as a shield by invoking home rule immunity, under
which the locality has exclusive autonomy in purely local mat-
ters.21  The balance between how a locality may exercise its home
rule initiative and immunity can be shifting and contentious, as
the following discussion will show.
An expansive notion of home rule initiative is ideal for several
reasons.  A broad grant of home rule initiative means that gov-
ernment power is exercised closest to the people it directly af-
fects.22  Home rule can permit localities to serve as “pilot
projects” for experimental forms of government that can best be
tested at a microcosmic level.23  Home rule also allows localities
to set policies that define their community character rather than
to conform to blunt, ill-fitting edicts from a distant, centralized
state government.24  A broad grant of home rule also prevents a
drain on a state legislature’s resources by delegating local issues
to localities.25  In the context of urban planning and land use
18 Nat’l League of Cities, About Cities: Home Rule, http://www.nlc.org/
about_cities/cities_101/153.cfm (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
19 Sandalow, supra  note 17, at 645. R
20 See  David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule , 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2325-29
(2003) (describing the initiative and immunity functions of home rule).
21 Id.
22 Id.  at 2259; Sandalow, supra  note 17, at 655; Vanlandingham, supra  note 1, at R
270.
23 OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35,
at 98 (1982).
24 Barron, supra  note 20, at 2259-60. R
25 Sandalow, supra  note 17, at 655. R
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management, expanded home rule initiative has been promoted
to foster a metropolitan area’s ability to combat sprawl and other
unwelcome effects of suburbanization.26
Meanwhile, those who argue for limits on home rule, or a nar-
row conception of home rule immunity, posit that broader local
control typically benefits privileged insiders.  They argue that
without strong state control on how land and services are distrib-
uted and designated within a region, poorer individuals end up
segregated within urban centers while the wealthy spread to “ex-
urbs,” taking much of the region’s resources with them.27  Ac-
cording to these critics, the state government has a better
perspective on how to address sprawl, inequities in education, af-
fordable housing, environmental quality, and other issues that
plague many urban centers.28
Underlying the debate on whether home rule solves or compli-
cates metropolitan planning issues is the question of how much
autonomy home rule provides local governments.  The answer to
this question depends upon whether the state has adopted home
rule as a legislative or constitutional grant.  Under a legislative
grant, the state confers powers on local governments or allows
them to adopt a home rule charter by statute.29  In contrast, con-
stitutional home rule—also referred to as an imperium in im-
perio30  regime—stems from an amendment to a state
constitution conveying governing powers to a city or region.31
While both the legislative and constitutional grants confer gov-
ernance powers on localities, under legislative home rule courts
can divine legislative intent through the rules of statutory con-
26 Barron, supra  note 20, at 2327. R
27 Id.  at 2261-62.  The theory is that if communities in a metropolitan area all have
autonomy under home rule, local governments will compete with one another to
attract the wealthiest residents and shut out poorer people who require more public
services.  In essence, home rule combined with zoning power creates a “white flight”
from cities to suburbs and exacerbates the gap between wealthy suburbs and the
core city. See id.  at 2330-31 (describing the rise of metropolitan fragmentation).
28 See id.  at 2261-62.
29 Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy:  Oregon’s
Home Rule Case Frames the Dilemma for State Constitutionalism , 76 OR. L. REV.
909, 912 (1997).
30 Vanlandingham, supra  note 1, at 285. Imperium in imperio  translates to “gov-
ernment within a government.”  Note that although Vanlandingham uses the con-
struction imperio in imperium , this Comment adopts the more common construction
imperium in imperio .
31 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 912.  Most early home rule systems in the late 1800s R
and early 1900s, including Oregon’s, stem from constitutional grants. Id.
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struction.32  As a result, localities in legislative home rule states
generally find their autonomy clearly but narrowly defined by
the legislature.  In contrast, in constitutional home rule states, lo-
calities generally enjoy a broader grant of autonomy.  Because
constitutional amendments generally provide for a broader inter-
pretation of local rights and responsibilities, courts, not legisla-
tures, draw the line between where state supremacy ends and
local autonomy begins.33
Oregon is an imperium in imperio  state, having adopted home
rule by amendment in 1906.34  To better understand Oregon’s
grant and subsequent interpretation of home rule, Part I.A looks
at the debates and history surrounding other states’ adoption of
home rule amendments to their constitutions.  In Part I.B, this
Comment then looks at the details surrounding the drafting and
adoption of Oregon’s home rule amendment.
A. Missouri, California, and the Other Home Rule Pioneers35
In 1875, Missouri became the first state to adopt home rule,
granting two provisions:  one to St. Louis and the other to all
other large cities.36  Article IX, section 16 provided that cities
with a population over 100,000 could create and amend charters
“consistent with but also ‘subject to’ the constitution and laws of
this State.”37  While drafting the amendments, delegates debated
over the meaning of its “consistent with” clause.  A majority of
the delegates interpreted the language as providing that the lo-
cality—in this case, St. Louis—was subject to all general state
laws with the exception that the state legislature could not pass
special laws affecting the locality.38  In other words, the majority
32 Id.  The legal doctrine that states have strict control over cities is known as
“Dillon’s Rule” after John Dillon, a state and federal judge who wrote an 1872 trea-
tise on municipal corporations.  Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept , 93
HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1109-13 (1980).   Dillon’s Rule was pervasive in the late nine-
teenth century.  The home rule movement was in part an effort to undo Dillon’s
Rule and provide cities with freedom from state interference in spheres of local
concern.  Richard Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I—The Structure of Local Govern-
ment Law , 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990).
33 See  Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 912. R
34 OR. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
35 This section is indebted to the exhaustive research in Cynthia Cumfer’s article,
supra  note 29. R
36 Id.  at 92.
37 MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, § 16 (now MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a)); see also
Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 920. R
38 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 919. R
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determined that general state laws established a floor, not a ceil-
ing, for St. Louis’ laws; beyond this floor, St. Louis could con-
struct local laws and ordinances without state interference.  In
subsequent cases, the Missouri Supreme Court held that only in
matters of statewide concern were charter provisions required to
be consistent with and subject to Missouri’s constitution and stat-
utes; where a charter provision concerning purely local matters
conflicted with state laws, the local provision prevailed.39  The
provision, as interpreted by the Missouri courts, “created an area
within which cities, freed entirely from state control, could gov-
ern themselves[,]” or an imperium in imperio ,40 as Justice Brewer
of the United States Supreme Court later described it.41
In 1879, California based its home rule amendment on Mis-
souri’s imperium in imperio  model with a primary modification
requiring that the state legislature approve or reject a local char-
ter.42  California courts, like Missouri courts, struggled with how
to quantify their home rule amendment, a debate that played out
compellingly in Thomason v. Ashworth .43  In that case, the ma-
jority determined that a general state rule trumped a conflicting
local ordinance providing for street maintenance regulations.44
This ruling was controversial, especially because many saw these
regulations as a purely local matter.45  After the court’s decision
in Thomason , voters amended the constitutional home rule char-
ter in 1896 to provide that the home rule was subject to and con-
trolled by general laws “except in municipal affairs.”46
In 1889, migrating Californians influenced Washington to
adopt a home rule amendment for cities with populations over
20,000.  It provided that home rule charters must be “consistent
39 See  Vanlandingham, supra  note 1, at 284-85 & n.85 (describing the Missouri
Supreme Court’s eventual conclusion).
40 Id. at 285.
41 See St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1893) (“The city of St.
Louis occupies a unique position. . . . [I]t framed its own charter under express au-
thority from the people of the state . . . . The city is in a very just sense an ‘imperium
in imperio .’”).
42 CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, §§ 8, 11; Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 920-21. R
43 14 P. 615 (Cal. 1887).
44 Id.  at 616; Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 921. R
45 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 921. R
46 CAL. CONST. of 1896, art. XI, § 6; Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 922.  Although the R
amendment “fixed” the Thomason  result, California courts continued to vacillate in
how they defined home rule powers. See, e.g. , Sato, supra note 3, at 1066-75 (sum-
marizing judicial decisions after the 1896 amendment).
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with and subject to the constitution and laws of [the] state.”47
Further, the amendment gave localities power to make all local
regulations “as are not in conflict with general laws.”48
Minnesota’s 1896 charter, the next home rule amendment to
be passed, was unique in that it granted home rule to all cities,
regardless of population.49  Adopting language nearly identical
to Missouri’s, Minnesota Constitution article IV, section 36 (now
article XII, section 4) authorized charters “consistent with and
subject to [the] laws of the State.”50  However, the provision
stated that the legislature should prescribe the general limits by
which a city may frame a charter and required that general state
laws supersede the same subject matter in a city charter.51  The
Minnesota Supreme Court, reading these provisions literally, de-
termined that home rule powers were subject to state legislative
control, in effect creating a model for states that later adopted
legislative home rule and rejecting Missouri’s imperium in im-
perio  model.52
Fueled by a burgeoning national municipal reform movement
and Denver’s ongoing conflicts with the state, Colorado passed
its home rule amendment in 1902.53  Like Missouri, Colorado
made two home rule grants:  one to Denver and another to cities
with a population of at least two thousand.54  Unlike the amend-
ments that other states had adopted, Colorado’s extensive char-
ter omitted specific provisions making home rule charters subject
to general state laws.55  Colorado courts have held that home
rule municipalities enjoy autonomy in purely local concerns and
mixed local and statewide concerns where there is no conflict
with a state law.56  However, local legislation regarding purely
statewide matters is entirely preempted.57
47 WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. XI, § 10; see also  Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 922-23. R
48 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 923. R
49 Id.
50 MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 4; Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 923. R
51 Vanlandingham, supra  note 1, at 286. R
52 Id.  at 286 & n.93.
53 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 927. R
54 COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 1, 6.
55 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 927.  Cumfer noted, however, that the Colorado Con- R
stitution also requires local officers to perform duties as “required . . . by the consti-
tution or by the general law.” COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 2; Cumfer, supra  note 29, at R
927 n.118.
56 Martin R. McCullough, A Primer on Municipal Home Rule in Colorado , 18
COLO. LAW. 443, 443 & n.5 (1989).
57 Id.  at 443.
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While Colorado passed its amendment, home rule proponents
in Oregon were drafting their own constitutional amendment to
provide for local autonomy.
B. Oregon’s Home Rule Amendments
In Oregon, William U’Ren58 led the home rule movement by
creating the People’s Power League, an organization devoted to
passing initiatives granting governance power to localities.59  For
the 1906 vote, the league redrafted a home rule proposal that
years earlier had passed the Oregon Senate but never made it to
popular vote.60  The original draft matched Washington’s amend-
ment, except that it eliminated the provision requiring local regu-
lations to not conflict with general laws and, like Minnesota’s
amendment, it allowed cities of any size to enact a home rule
charter.61  The new draft eliminated the necessity for legislative
action to approve or reject a charter and changed the limitation
on the grant of power from “consistent with and subject to the
constitution and laws of this state” to “subject to the Constitution
and criminal laws of the State of Oregon.”  In addition, the draft-
ers eliminated a clause rendering charters “subject to and con-
trolled by general laws.”62
The People’s Power League then distributed a pamphlet pro-
moting the measure, claiming that
[t]he adoption of these constitutional amendments will give
COMPLETE HOME RULE to the voters of every county,
city and town, through the local application of the initiative
and referendum to all purely local business, including CITY
CHARTERS to be enacted and amended by each city for it-
self, LOCAL LAWS AND FRANCHISES passed by the
legislature, and ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND
FRANCHISES passed by city councils and county courts.63
58 William Simon U’Ren (1859–1949) was born in Wisconsin and lived in Colo-
rado for roughly ten years where he studied law and became a newspaper editor.
He later moved to Oregon where he became involved in the initiative and referen-
dum movement.  Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 928-29.  For more on U’Ren’s influence
on this movement, see David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct
Democracy:  William Simon U’Ren and “The Oregon System ,”  67 TEMP. L. REV. 947
(1994).
59 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 930-31. R
60 Id. at 928 (providing a brief explanation of the proposed amendment, which
was modeled after Washington’s home rule amendment).
61 Id.  at 927-28.
62 Id.  at 930-31.
63 Id.  at 931 (quoting THE PEOPLE’S POWER LEAGUE OF OREGON, 1906 CAM-
PAIGN LEAFLET 1 (1906) (available at the Oregon State Library, Salem, Or.)).
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Most newspaper editorials supported (or simply described) the
amendment as a welcome change that took power from the legis-
lature and placed it in the people’s hands to set local policy and
regulations.64  In June 1906, voters overwhelmingly passed the
home rule amendment as the People’s Power League drafted it,
with 52,567 in favor and 19,852 opposed.65
Several factors in the above history suggest that the drafters
intended Oregon’s home rule to grant significant autonomy to
localities.  In light of the debates stemming from other states’
provisions, the drafters’ replacement of the language making
charters “subject to and controlled by general laws” with “subject
to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon” is
significant and suggests an effort to confer broader power to lo-
calities.  Based on the founders’ familiarity with other similar
home rule amendments, their language setting the floor for local-
ities’ home rule initiative at “Constitutional and criminal laws”
implicates the drafters’ intention to convey localities more auton-
omy than the states that provided for a floor of “all general
laws.”  That is, had the drafters intended general laws to super-
sede local ordinances, they easily could have left that language
within the provision.  Further, the language of the People’s
Power League Pamphlet emphasizing “complete home rule” sug-
gests the framers had in mind a broad grant of home rule initia-
tive to localities.66  The newspaper accounts supporting the
amendment further suggest that the voters’ intent mirrored that
of the framers.  However, Oregon courts have not consistently
adopted this interpretation.
II
OREGON COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF HOME RULE
Despite U’Ren and the People’s Power League’s efforts to
draft a clear constitutional home rule charter, Oregon’s home
rule amendment bears the burden of nearly one hundred years of
conflicting judicial decisions construing the tension between state
64 Id.  at 931-32.
65 Id.  at 932.
66 As Cumfer explains, the framers of Oregon’s home rule amendment were also
familiar with the National Municipal League, a group that led the movement advo-
cating for increased local power and the adoption of home rule amendments. See id.
at 933-34.  In fact, U’Ren and other members of the People’s Power League partici-
pated in the National Municipal League’s advisory and executive committees. Id.  at
934.
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law and local ordinances.  In light of the copious case law inter-
preting the scope of Oregon’s home rule amendment, Part II.A
of this Comment focuses on the major cases leading up to the
current rule in La Grande , while Part II.B looks at the majority
and dissenting opinions in La Grande  as well as subsequent case
law regarding home rule in Oregon.
A. The Great Push and Pull:  Pre-La Grande Case Law
Oregon’s first real judicial test of home rule came in 1909 with
Straw v. Harris .67  The case arose when the state legislature cre-
ated a locality, the Port of Coos Bay, within the boundaries of
four coastal Oregon cities.68  The mayor of Marshfield, one of the
cities affected by the port, claimed that the legislature, by creat-
ing the port, amended his city’s charter.69  The court held that
although the legislature could not directly  amend a city charter, it
could pass a charter, law, or rule that indirectly  affected a city’s
charter.70  Writing for the majority, Justice King explained that
although the home rule amendment’s text seemed to provide that
incorporated cities had “exclusive control” over their own affairs
to the point of excluding the state,
it cannot be held that the State has surrendered its sovereignty
to the municipalities to the extent that it must be deemed to
have perpetually lost control over them.  This no State can do.
The logical sequence of a judicial interpretation to such effect
would amount to a recognition of a state’s independent right
of dissolution.  It would but lead to sovereigntial suicide.  It
would result in the creation of states within the state, and
eventually in the surrender of all state sovereignty—all of
which is expressly inhibited by Article IV, § 3, of our national
constitution.71
Justice King went on to say that through general laws only, “the
State, therefore, regardless of any declarations in its constitution
to the contrary, may at any time revise, amend, or even repeal
any or all of the charters within it, subject, of course, to vested
rights and limitations otherwise provided by our fundamental
laws.”72  Under the Straw  court’s interpretation, the home rule
amendment merely forbade the legislature from enacting special
67 54 Or. 424, 103 P. 777 (1909).
68 Id.  at 433, 103 P. at 781.
69 Id.  at 434, 103 P. at 781.
70 Id.  at 435, 103 P. at 781.
71 Id.  at 436, 103 P. at 782.
72 Id.  at 436-37, 103 P. at 782 (emphasis added).
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laws directed at a municipality, greatly limiting local home rule
sovereignty.
In 1914, however, the court took a dramatic swing toward a
broader grant of imperium in imperio  autonomy in Branch v. Al-
bee .73  In Branch , the court looked at a legislative measure re-
quiring cities of 50,000 or more residents to pay a tax benefiting a
local police pension fund.74  Portland, which was then the only
qualifying Oregon city, sued, claiming that the act amended its
charter and thus violated the Oregon Constitution under the
home rule provision.75  Justice Ramsey, writing for the majority,
construed article XI, section 2’s provision that “[t]he legislative
assembly shall not  enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of
incorporation for any municipality, city or town” as an “abso-
lute” prohibition.76  Responding to Justice King’s dictum in
Straw , Justice Ramsey declared that
[t]he Constitution does not  provide that the legislative assem-
bly shall not enact, amend, or repeal a city charter by special
laws .  It declares that said body shall not  enact, amend, or re-
peal a charter, and the meaning of this provision is that it shall
not do that in any manner.  The inhibition is absolute .77
According to Ramsey, the legislative act here, singling out the
only Oregon city with a population of over 50,000 inhabitants,
constituted a blatant attempt to legislate purely local matters and
indirectly affect Portland’s charter.78
The victory for local autonomy was short-lived, however.  In
Rose v. Port of Portland ,79 the Port of Portland, a legislative crea-
tion, wanted to use Portland city funds to improve its slough but
had no provisions in its charter permitting the expenditure.80
The plaintiff challenged the port’s right to amend its charter by
initiative.81  Justice Harris wrote for a unanimous bench, holding
that as an initial matter the constitution did not permit a port to
73 71 Or. 188, 142 P. 598 (1914).
74 Id.  at 190-93, 142 P. at 598-99.
75 Id.  at 190-93, 142 P. at 598-99.
76 Id.  at 195-96, 142 P. at 600.
77 Id.  at 199-200, 142 P. at 601.  Justice Ramsey later qualified his strong language
making sure to “not hold that cities can . . . extend their authority and jurisdiction
over subjects that are not properly municipal and germane to the purposes for which
municipal corporations are formed.” Id.  at 205, 142 P. at 603.
78 Id.  at 205, 142 P. at 603.
79 82 Or. 541, 162 P. 498 (1917).
80 Id.  at 545, 162 P. at 499.
81 Id.  at 545, 162 P. at 499.  It is not clear from the text of the case or materials
that discuss it who the plaintiff in Rose  was.  However, no city was a party or amicus
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amend its own charter.82  Justice Harris further wrote that even
though the home rule provision allowed localities to amend their
charters, if a local ordinance conflicted with a state law, the home
rule amendment conferred supremacy to the state even if the lo-
cality passed its ordinance first.83  As primary support for the
court’s decision, Harris produced a letter and tentative amend-
ment draft circulated by the People’s Power League and signed
by one of its officers at the time, Thomas A. McBride, who was
the Rose  court’s chief justice.84  In part, the letter read, “Of what
interest are the local laws of Portland to farmers of Klamath
County, or the charter or ordinances of Lakeview to the fisher-
men of the Columbia River?  This amendment is another step
towards home rule in home affairs .”85  In light of this language
and a corresponding independent declaration by McBride, Harris
construed that McBride and the other framers intended to permit
the legislature to retain authority to enact general laws binding
upon home rule cities.86
In 1936, the court shifted yet again in City of Portland v.
Welch .87  At issue in this case was a statute providing for the “su-
pervision, regulation, limitation and levy of taxes” on cities with
a population of 100,000 or more.88  The law also provided that
the state tax commission could alter Portland’s city budget.89
The court recognized that local taxation might be a concern for
the state and that the Oregon Constitution limited how much a
municipality could levy taxes.90 It reasoned that the legislature
could, by general law, limit the tax levies a municipality could
curiae intervenor in this case. ORVAL ETTER, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OREGON
260 (Sourcebook Version 1991) (available at the Univ. of Or. Law Library, Eugene).
82 Rose , 82 Or. at 553-54, 162 P. at 502.  The court in Rose  also noted that in cases
challenging the ability of a local government to amend its charter, article XI, section
2 was to be read in concert with article IV, section 1(a), which addresses the scope of
initiative and referendum powers. Id.  at 548, 162 P. at 500.
83 Id.  at 572-73, 162 P. at 508.
84 Id.  at 560, 162 P. at 504.
85 Id.  at 561, 162 P. at 504 (emphasis added).
86 Id.  at 572, 162 P. at 508.  Although Harris did not indicate how or where Chief
Justice McBride clarified the drafters’ intent, later courts and writers found signifi-
cance in the fact that McBride joined the unanimous Rose  court and was also one of
two dissenters in Branch .  City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 281 Or.
137, 143-44, 576 P.2d 1204, 1208-09 (1978); Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 914.  For a R
detailed discussion of Rose ’s flaws, see ETTER, supra  note 81, at 236-59.
87 154 Or. 286, 59 P.2d 228 (1936).
88 Id.  at 289, 59 P.2d at 229.
89 Id.  at 291-92, 59 P.2d at 230-31.
90 Id.  at 298, 59 P.2d at 233.
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impose, but that was “a far cry from [an enactment that] purports
to authorize an appointive commission to ‘approve, reject, or re-
duce the budget or any items therein,’ even though the city has
not exceeded any limitation fixed by the constitution or stat-
ute.”91  The court upheld the Branch  court’s imperium in imperio
rule, holding that the law violated the home rule amendments to
the extent that it authorized the commission to alter a locality’s
budget.92
Despite Welch , the next twenty-six years saw most courts fol-
lowing Rose  and its predecessors93 until 1962, when the Oregon
Supreme Court yet again reinterpreted home rule in State ex rel.
Heinig v. City of Milwaukie .94  The main issue in Heinig  was sim-
ilar to that in Branch ; namely, the city of Milwaukie challenged a
legislative act requiring cities of a certain size to set up a civil
service commission for its city firemen.95  After citing a line of
cases following the reasoning in Branch ,96 the court held that the
legislative assembly did not have the authority to enact a law of
general applicability relating to city government unless the sub-
ject matter of the enactment was of general concern to the
state.97  Justice O’Connell wrote for a unanimous court that judi-
cial balancing was key and that “‘[t]he real test is not whether
the state or the city has an interest in the matter, for usually they
both have, but whether the state’s [or city’s] interest . . . is
paramount.’”98
91 Id.  at 298, 59 P.2d at 233.
92 Id.  at 298, 59 P.2d at 233.  The court further noted, “If such items of expendi-
ture can be eliminated or reduced, in accordance with the judgment of members of a
non-elective commission, then the right of local self government under the Home
Rule Amendments of the constitution has become a hollow mockery.” Id.  at 298-
99, 59 P.2d at 233.
93 E.g. , Burton v. Gibbons, 148 Or. 370, 378-79, 36 P.2d 786, 789 (1934), overruled
in part by  State ex rel.  Heinig v. City of Milwaukie, 231 Or. 473, 479, 373 P.2d 680,
683 (1962); City of Klamath Falls v. Or. Liquor Control Comm’n, 146 Or. 83, 93, 29
P.2d 564, 568 (1934); Tichner v. City of Portland, 101 Or. 294, 301, 200 P. 466, 468
(1921), overruled in part by  City of Portland v. Welch, 154 Or. 286, 301, 59 P.2d 228,
234 (1936); Lovejoy v. City of Portland, 95 Or. 459, 471-74, 188 P. 207, 211-12 (1920);
City of Portland v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 89 Or. 325, 334, 173 P. 1178, 1181 (1918);
Colby v. City of Medford, 85 Or. 485, 534, 167 P. 487, 502 (1917).
94 231 Or. 473, 373 P.2d 680 (1962), overruled by  City of La Grande v. Pub. Em-
ployees Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 146-47, 576 P.2d 1204, 1210 (1978).
95 Id.  at 474, 373 P.2d at 681.
96 See id.  at 477 n.7, 373 P.2d at 683 n.7.
97 Id.  at 479, 373 P.2d at 683-84.
98 Id.  at 481, 373 P.2d at 684-85 (quoting AUSTIN F. MACDONALD, AMERICAN
CITY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 79 (3d ed. 1941)).
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Further, O’Connell squarely placed responsibility on the court
to referee when two political agencies make conflicting claims of
autonomy.99  O’Connell advocated a balancing approach for the
court in its role as referee, writing that “it is not necessary to
regard all of the activities of a municipal department as either
local or state-wide; some of the activities may be predominantly
local, whereas others may be predominantly state-wide.”100
O’Connell, in dictum, also acknowledged that sovereignty ema-
nated from the people, and nothing about that grant suggested
a constructional preference for state legislation.  In fact, there
is reason to accept a contrary construction favoring the charter
over the statute  if we should take the view expressed by many
that home rule is superior to state rule in carrying out the ide-
als of representative government.  It has been urged that “Un-
less there is an imperative need that a service have statewide
uniformity, it may be presumed that local agencies will per-
form it with greater public satisfaction, if not indeed with
greater economy.”101
Heinig  was a victory for supporters of the expansive home rule
initiative.  Under the Heinig  test, the court was designated to ar-
bitrate the question of whether the issue involved was of
predominantly local or state interest, creating a balancing test
rather than the bright-line rule established in Rose  and Straw .
Although Heinig  redefined the rule, that court did not rely on
evidence of the home rule amendment founders’ intent in reach-
ing its decision.102  This omission, whether intentional or not,
may have proved to be Heinig ’s Achilles’ heel sixteen years later
when the Oregon Supreme Court yet again reinterpreted Ore-
gon’s home rule amendment.
B. Home Rule, Interrupted: City of La Grande v. Public
Employees Retirement Board
The court’s ultimate reinterpretation of the home rule amend-
ment came in City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement
Board ,103 a case challenging a 1971 legislative enactment requir-
ing all city, county, or district firefighters and police to be
brought within the state’s public employee retirement system un-
99 Id.  at 483-84, 373 P.2d at 686.
100 Id.  at 484-85, 373 P.2d at 686.
101 Id.  at 488, 373 P.2d at 688 (quoting Rodney L. Mott, Strengthening Home
Rule , 39 NAT’L MUN. REV. 172, 175 (1950)) (emphasis added).
102 Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 914. R
103 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204 (1978).
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less the public employer already provided equal or more exten-
sive benefits.104  Writing for a sharply divided court, Justice
Linde construed the home rule amendments as mainly providing
administrative shortcuts that “allow the people of the locality to
decide upon the organization of their government and the scope
of its powers under its charter without having to obtain statutory
authorization from the legislature.”105  Drawing back to the in-
tent Justice Harris elucidated in Rose , Linde adopted an Erie -
like test where the court looked to whether the state’s regulatory
effect on the locality was substantive or procedural.106  If the ef-
fect was substantive, state law was superior; if the effect was on a
locality’s procedural policies, the local ordinance ruled.  As
Linde explained, “[e]xcept for limits on initiative and referen-
dum . . . the [home rule] amendments do not purport to divide
areas of substantive policy between the levels of government.”107
Accordingly, the four-justice majority held that where state law
and local rule or ordinance conflicted, state law prevailed unless
the ordinance pertained to local government structure or proce-
dures.108  In essence, the La Grande  majority took a 180-degree
turn from the Heinig  balancing approach, advocating instead a
test presuming legislative supremacy with virtually no judicial
balancing.
In a vigorous and lengthy dissent, Justice Tongue claimed that
the majority’s decision drastically upset the balance of power be-
tween cities and states as to when home rule permits local auton-
omy over local interests.109  Tongue cited several law review
definitions of “home rule” that emphasized its basic purpose to
stake out a limited area where local government could legislate
for itself and further noted that “[a]lmost without exception,
modern students of municipal affairs have urged the desirability
of a broad grant of municipal initiative through the mechanism of
home rule.”110  The crux of Tongue’s argument was that a
broader grant of home rule authority provides municipal govern-
104 Id.  at 139, 576 P.2d at 1206.
105 Id.  at 142, 576 P.2d at 1208.
106 Id.  at 142, 576 P.2d at 1208.
107 Id.  at 143, 576 P.2d at 1208.
108 Id.  at 156, 576 P.2d at 1215; see also  Cumfer, supra  note 29, at 914. R
109 La Grande , 281 Or. at 157, 576 P.2d at 1215-16 (Tongue, J., dissenting).
110 Id.  at 160, 576 P.2d at 1217 (quoting Sandalow, supra  note 17, at 652). R
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ments the flexibility to govern themselves generally, without lim-
iting their functionality and miring them in uncertainty.111
Tongue further accused the majority of substituting “legislative
supremacy” for “local autonomy,” noting the two types of state
constitutional provisions for home rule:  (1) local autonomy, in
which a municipality is granted limited autonomy and the court
decides the boundaries; or (2) legislative supremacy, in which
legislative grace controls except in those purely local matters not
preempted by state legislation.112  In addition, Tongue contended
that at the time voters adopted Oregon’s amendment, Califor-
nia’s and Missouri’s home rule amendments favored local auton-
omy.113  He observed that the language in Oregon’s article XI,
section 2 seemed to most closely resemble those states’ home
rule amendments with the differences in the text generally in ac-
cord with the notion of local autonomy.114  Accordingly, Tongue
concluded, it was more likely that the amendment framers fa-
vored local autonomy over legislative supremacy when they
chose the words they did.115
Finally, Tongue charged the majority with overruling a line of
what he characterized to be consistent decisions since Welch .116
Although the court experienced an initial division between
Branch  and Rose , according to Tongue, the Oregon court had
not ideologically budged from its decision readopting imperium
in imperio  in Welch .117  Tongue then noted that Heinig  upheld
Welch  and its “purpose . . . to make operative the concept that
the closer those who make and execute the laws are to the citi-
zens they represent[,] the better are those citizens repre-
sented.”118  By weakening home rule provisions, Tongue argued,
the majority upset the balance between the state and its cities by
presuming legislative supremacy, making a fundamental shift
111 See id.  at 160 n.5, 576 P.2d at 1217 n.5.
112 Id.  at 160, 576 P.2d at 1217 (quoting Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Constitu-
tional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) Model , 17 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 2 (1975)).  Tongue was essentially describing home rule initiative and home
rule immunity. See supra  text accompanying notes 17-28. R
113 La Grande , 281 Or. at 161-63 & n.8, 576 P.2d at 1217-18 & n.8 (Tongue, J.,
dissenting).
114 Id.  at 161-63 & n.8, 576 P.2d at 1217-18 & n.8.
115 Id.  at 162, 576 P.2d at 1218.
116 Id.  at 163, 576 P.2d at 1218.
117 Id.  at 163, 576 P.2d at 1218.
118 Id.  at 164, 576 P.2d at 1219 (quoting State ex rel.  Heinig v. City of Milwaukie,
231 Or. 473, 481-82, 373 P.2d 680, 685 (1962)).
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from the drafters’ original intent.119  As a parting shot, Tongue
accused the majority of using La Grande  as a “judicial tour de
force ,” asserting that the court could have reached the same con-
clusion by applying the Heinig  test, but instead legislated from
the bench.120
Despite Tongue’s vitriolic dissent, subsequent courts have fol-
lowed La Grande ,121 and it remains the controlling law today.
As a result, when a state law conflicts with a local regulation,
generally the state law controls unless it affects the home rule’s
charter in procedural matters.  For instance, to take an example
provided by Linde in La Grande , a general state regulatory law
imposing policy responsibilities or record-keeping, reporting, or
negotiating requirements on individuals or entities contrary to
their allocation under a local charter would not be valid under
the home rule amendments.122  Further, based on the sub-
stance–procedure divide and the narrow exceptions drawn in La
Grande , arguably most—if not all—state laws or measures re-
garding land use will trump conflicting local ordinances or rules.
This reality combined with the recent passage of Measure 37
spells bad news for those Oregon municipalities and regions ap-
plying their grant of home rule to control land use in an effort to
combat metropolitan sprawl.  Specifically, Metro, a quasi-govern-
mental regional agency held up by urban planners as implement-
ing a successful model of smart growth,123 faces challenges in
light of the La Grande  rule and Measure 37.
119 Id.  at 191-92, 576 P.2d at 1233.
120 Id.  at 191, 576 P.2d at 1233.  Interestingly, Tongue’s dissent provides some
curious background on whether Heinig  should have been revisited in La Grande .
According to Tongue, none of the parties or amicus curiae contended in their briefs
that Heinig  should be overruled. Id.  at 171-72, 576 P.2d at 1223.  Prior to oral argu-
ment, the court requested the parties be prepared in oral argument to respond to
questions regarding whether Heinig  should be reconsidered. Id.  at 172, 576 P.2d at
1223.  At oral argument, counsel for a defendant suggested that Heinig  be refined by
substituting a “substantial or significant state interest” for “predominant state inter-
est”; however, none of the parties advanced the theory that the court ultimately
adopted. Id.  at 172, 576 P.2d at 1223.
121 E.g. , City of Portland v. Jackson, 316 Or. 143, 850 P.2d 1093 (1993); City of
Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or. 490, 714 P.2d 220 (1986); City of Roseburg v. Rose-
burg City Firefighters Local No. 1489, 292 Or. 266, 639 P.2d 90 (1981); Springfield
Util. Bd. v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 191 Or. App. 536, 84 P.3d 167 (2004), aff’d ,
339 Or. 631, 125 P.3d 740 (2005).
122 La Grande , 281 Or. at 156 n.31, 576 P.2d at 1215 n.31.  Justice Linde admitted
that under the court’s construction such a state and local conflict would be rare. Id.
at 156 n.31, 576 P.2d at 1215 n.31.
123 See sources cited supra note 13.
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III
METRO AND MEASURE 37:  IMMOVABLE OBJECT
MEETS IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
“Keep Portland Weird” is a ubiquitous bumper sticker in the
Portland area.  Although the slogan refers to a movement to sup-
port local businesses, the sentiment might as well apply to Metro,
the unique semigovernmental hybrid of home rule entity, regula-
tory enforcer, and special district covering Portland and parts of
Multnomah, Clackamas, and Washington counties.124  While
most U.S. localities have constitutional or legislative grants of
home rule autonomy,125 Metro’s scope of power is unusual, par-
ticularly concerning land use and controlled growth.  Often
called an “experiment,” Metro has developed to provide a com-
plex test case for many other cities throughout the country strug-
gling to address sprawl and control growth.126  However, this
experiment faces what could be its downfall in Measure 37, a
2004 voter initiative penned by some of the most vocal critics of
Oregon’s land use planning regime.127  Parts III.A and B of this
Comment outline the history of land use planning in Oregon and
Metro’s origins and current structure.  Part III.C then provides
an overview of Measure 37’s provisions, the debates surrounding
its passage, and what it all may mean for Metro.
A. History of Metro
In 1973, in response to growing concerns regarding the loss of
Oregon’s farmland and natural resources to the state’s growing
cities, the legislature created a statewide comprehensive land use
planning system through Senate Bills 100 and 101.128  The bills,
which called for a blend of centralized and decentralized regula-
tion, created the Land Conservation and Development Commis-
sion (LCDC), an agency that enforces nineteen planning goals
124 See generally Metro Home Page, supra note 11.
125 The exceptions are Mississippi, Vermont, and Virginia, which are governed by
Dillon’s Rule.  Darin M. Dalmat, Note, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home:
The Legal Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule , 39 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 93, 102-03, 138; see supra  note 32 and accompanying text. R
126 See  Ethan Seltzer, It’s Not an Experiment:  Regional Planning at Metro, 1990 to
the Present , in THE PORTLAND EDGE, supra  note 13, at 59. R
127 Oregonians in Action, supra  note 15. R
128 S.B. 100 & 101, 57th Or. Legis. Ass’y (1973); Keith Aoki, All the King’s Horses
and All the King’s Men:  Hurdles to Putting the Fragmented Metropolis Back To-
gether Again?  Statewide Land Use Planning, Portland Metro and Oregon’s Measure
37 , 21 J.L. & POL. 397, 426-27 (2005).
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that local governments must meet in formulating local compre-
hensive plans.129  Goal 14 in particular requires localities to
adopt expandable urban growth boundaries (UGBs), which in-
clude an estimated twenty-year land supply for expected residen-
tial, industrial, and commercial urban growth.130
In the decades preceding Senate Bill 100, Portland experienced
gradual population decline, a recession, and an explosion in the
number of “special districts” regulating services such as fire,
water, zoning, sewers, and parks.131  Mostly out of concern for
consolidating these multitudinous districts, in 1963 the legislature
established and funded the Portland Metropolitan Study Com-
mission (PMSC) and charged it with preparing a “comprehensive
plan for the furnishing of such metropolitan services as . . . desir-
able in the metropolitan area.”132  PMSC was also expected to
consider a full range of options for regional governmental struc-
tures, such as annexation, intergovernmental agreements, consol-
idation of cities, or consolidation of cities and counties.133
PMSC’s initial recommendation to consolidate the governments
in the Portland tri-county area was rejected by the state legisla-
ture in 1967.134
Meanwhile, in 1966, the United States Department of Housing
129 This setup is called a “two-tier” regionalist system by some writers.  Barron,
supra  note 20, at 2382.  In this system, regional governments set goals and manage R
matters affecting the region as a whole, freeing cities and municipalities within the
region to make decisions on local matters. Id. at 2262, 2272-76.  For the text of the
nineteen comprehensive goals, see the LCDC web site, http://egov.oregon.gov/LCD/
goals.shtml#Statewide_Planning_Goals (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
130 OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000(14) (2006), available at  http://www.lcd.state.or.
us/LCD/docs/goals/goal14.pdf, at 1; see infra  text accompanying notes 164-73 R
(describing the UGB in Metro’s region).
131 Aoki, supra  note 128, at 427-28 & nn.149-50.  Special districts are “pseudo- R
governments” created to provide services such as water, parks, sewers, and transpor-
tation outside of local government politics.  Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
II—Localism and Legal Theory , 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 375 (1990).  Special dis-
tricts can be problematic because positions within the districts are unelected and
therefore unaccountable.  Further, when one district devises a solution to a local
need, that solution may not necessarily align with surrounding municipalities’ policy
interests. Id.  at 376-77.
Between 1941 and 1961, the number of special districts in the Metro tri-county
area increased from 28 to 218, making Oregon, at the time, seventh in the nation for
the number of special districts in a state.  Carl Abbott & Margery Post Abbott, His-
torical Development of the Metropolitan Service District , METRO, May 1991, http://
www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?articleID=2937.
132 Abbott & Abbott, supra  note 131, at Part II.
133 Id.
134 Aoki, supra  note 128, at 428; Abbott & Abbott, supra  note 131, at Part II.
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and Urban Development required every metropolitan area in the
country to form a “Metropolitan Planning Organization” to man-
age comprehensive regional planning.135  PMSC responded by
creating the Columbia Regional Association of Governments
(CRAG).136  Initially a voluntary-membership organization,
CRAG was structured as a council of governments that repre-
sented area cities and counties.137
CRAG’s efforts to create a comprehensive land use plan ran
aground due to intergovernmental rivalries and other problems.
Suburban delegates were part-time mayors and city council
members who were already stretched too thin to effectively par-
ticipate.138  When delegates did participate, they were often torn
between the needs of planning and protecting their communities
and the possibility of compromising their local interests to the
rest of CRAG’s members.139  Unstable funding also severely lim-
ited CRAG’s ability to function.  Although the group received
some federal funding, it depended mainly on member jurisdic-
tions for revenue.140  Because membership was voluntary, mem-
bers could threaten to leave CRAG and take their money with
them.141  In 1973, membership became mandatory for Multno-
mah, Clackamas, and Washington counties; this move stabilized
funding, but partisanship still ran high, especially since Portland
held roughly a quarter of CRAG’s votes and was in a powerful
position to define regional goals.142  Further criticism plagued
CRAG due to the distinct lack of public involvement in planning;
although a 1976 ballot measure seeking to abolish CRAG failed,
the group was never popular among Oregon voters.143
While CRAG floundered, PMSC formed the Metropolitan
Service District (MSD) in 1970.144  PMSC created MSD to be a
governmental “box” that could contain all the tri-county service
135 Abbott & Abbott, supra  note 131, at Part II.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.  at Part V.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See id.  The members’ strong leverage was evident:  in 1970, CRAG’s “Interim
Regional Land-Use Plan” was little more than the local jurisdictions’ plans collated
together with some open spaces “penciled in.” CARL ABBOTT, PORTLAND:  PLAN-
NING, POLITICS, AND GROWTH IN A TWENTIETH-CENTURY CITY 242 (1983).
142 Abbott & Abbott, supra  note 131.
143 See ABBOTT, supra  note 141, at 242; Abbott & Abbott, supra  note 131, at Part
V.
144 Abbott & Abbott, supra  note 131, at Part IV.
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districts and their attendant responsibilities that voters or the leg-
islature assigned to it.145  In May 1970, voters approved MSD by
a 95,753 to 82,400 vote.146  MSD drew its seven-member board
from local elected officials with its initial responsibilities encom-
passing waste management.147  Unfortunately for the fledgling
organization, voters rejected providing MSD with a tax base,
leaving MSD with few resources to fulfill its existing and poten-
tially new duties.148
Finally, in 1977, the legislature proposed combining CRAG’s
planning responsibilities with the functional scope of MSD.149
The proposal showed up on the 1978 ballot as Measure 6 and
passed by 20,000 votes, a surprising margin even to those who
promoted the measure.150  A reconstituted MSD began operating
in January 1979.151  Throughout the 1980s, MSD went through
growing pains by fleshing out its functions and procedures,
though it was still hampered by financial issues and unclear
boundaries as to the extent of its powers.152  In 1990, voters ap-
proved a measure that became a constitutional amendment
granting MSD power to adopt a home rule charter.153  Finally, in
1992, Portland metropolitan area voters adopted a home rule
charter for MSD, which at this point changed its name to
Metro.154
Today, Metro exercises centralized regulatory authority from





149 Funded by a grant from the National Academy for Public Administration, the
Tri-County Local Government Planning Commission developed the plan for com-
bining CRAG and MSD. Id.
150 Id. Confusing ballot wording (i.e, “Reorganize Metropolitan Service District,
Abolish CRAG”) may have had something to do with the wide margin of victory.
Voters hoping to eliminate the area’s metropolitan planning agencies may have un-
wittingly voted to create a more powerful one. Id.
151 Id.  at Part VII.
152 See generally id.
153 OR. CONST. art. XI, § 14; ABBOTT, supra  note 13, at 160. R
154 ABBOTT, supra  note 13, at 160. R
155 Nearly all regional home rule structures appoint their leaders; in contrast,
Metro has an elected governing board, or council.  Metro’s council is made up of
seven councilors, one of whom is elected president by popular vote and six of whom
are nominated and elected by individual districts within the Metro area.  Metro
Charter § 16(2) (2003), available at  http://www.metro-region.org/library_docs/
about/charter.nov2000.may2002.clean.03.pdf.  Each councilor serves a four-year
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ernment representatives.156  The 1992 home rule charter gave
voters within Metro’s districts the ability to make changes and
improvements to Metro’s structure and responsibilities.157  By its
home rule authority, Metro has any powers that could be granted
by the United States or Oregon legislature.158  Metro’s charter
construes its subjects of jurisdiction broadly as “matters of met-
ropolitan concern.”159  On the whole, Metro may take on addi-
tional functions with the approval of the Metropolitan Policy
Advisory Committee, a committee of twenty-eight members rep-
resenting governing bodies of the counties, cities, and special dis-
tricts within Metro.160
Metro’s charter also lays out its scope of authority, which en-
compasses management and planning functions.  Metro’s man-
agement authority extends over the regional zoo, water sources
and storage, parks, convention and recreation facilities, and
waste.161  Metro’s current planning responsibilities encompass
and realize CRAG’s original purpose to create a regional frame-
work plan as a basis for local government comprehensive land
use plans and regulations.162  Metro’s regional framework plan
addresses regional transportation and mass transit systems plan-
ning; management of the UGB; protection of natural resources
on lands outside the UGB; assessment of housing density, urban
design, and settlement patterns; acquisitions of parks, open
spaces, and recreational facilities; water sources and storage; and
other development and land use planning issues.163
The regional framework plan further mandates Metro to for-
mulate, apply, and adapt the UGB.164  As explained above, the
LCDC requires regional land use governing bodies to create an
expandable UGB that encompasses the area’s estimated supply
of developable land for the next twenty years.165  Metro created
term. Id.  § 16(3).  Aside from the council president, an auditor is also elected regu-
larly and serves Metro in a full-time capacity for a four-year term.  The auditor, who
has no executive power, is responsible for reviewing finances and making recom-
mendations to the council for remedial actions. Id.  § 17.
156 Id. §§ 7(2)(a), 26; see  Aoki, supra  note 128, at 429-30.
157 Aoki, supra  note 128, at 429.
158 Metro Charter, supra  note 155, § 9.
159 Id.  § 4.
160 Id.  §§ 7(2)(a), 26; Aoki, supra  note 128, at 429-30.
161 Metro Charter, supra note 155, § 5(2)(b).
162 Id.  § 5(2); Aoki, supra  note 128, at 431.
163 Metro Charter, supra  note 155, § 5(2)(b).
164 See  Aoki, supra  note 128, at 432.
165 See supra  text accompanying notes 128-29. R
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its first UGB in 1979, which embraced 236,000 acres and crossed
city and county lines.166  In 1988, Metro’s councilors realized that
they lacked a standard process for amending Metro’s UGB.167  In
response, Metro developed its “Region 2040” plan to accommo-
date up to a million more residents in four core counties.168
Region 2040 started as an effort to determine how to expand
the UGB and ended with a debate over how to constrain expan-
sion.169  Overall, the plan anticipates sharply increased density in
central Portland in six regional growth centers and along transit
corridors.170  The intent of establishing the UGB is to prevent
sprawl by providing for “an orderly and efficient transition from
rural to urban use.”171  In effect, the UGB creates a dual land
market that assigns different values to acreage inside and outside
the boundary.172  As an additional measure to avoid too much
density, Metro added rural reserves within its UGB.173
Metro’s Region 2040 plan and UGB are worth little if Metro
lacks the power to enforce its provisions.  Just as Metro’s plans
must comply with LCDC’s nineteen planning goals, Metro’s
charter provides that counties and cities within the Metro district
may engage in comprehensive planning and regulation as long as
166 ABBOTT, supra  note 13, at 162-63; Aoki, supra note 128, at 432.  For a current R
map showing the UGB, see Map of the Urban Growth Boundary, May 2006, http://
www.metro-region.org/library_docs/land_use/may06ugb.pdf.
167 ABBOTT, supra  note 13, at 166. R
168 Id. at 166-67.
169 Id.  at 167.
170 Id.  at 168.
171 Id.  at 163 (quoting language from LCDC Goal 14 on urbanization).  Abbott
states that the UGB seems to have met its goals according to census data. Id.  at 169.
Since the UGB was created in 1979, the area of developed land within the UGB has
increased more slowly than it had in the previous thirty years, and the previous
downward trend in residential density has reversed. Id.  Between 1980 and 1994, the
metropolitan population increased by twenty-five percent but the land designated
for urban use increased by just sixteen percent. Id.  This trend contrasts other
American metropolitan areas that, at the time, saw a much greater disparity be-
tween the rapid growth in urbanized land and slower growth in population. See id.
172 Id.  at 163.  Metro’s UGB is particularly noteworthy in that it has served as a
muse for performance artist Linda K. Johnson, who in 1999 camped in thirty-six-
hour intervals at six points on the UGB, chatting with visitors. Id.  at 167-68.  The
result, according to Johnson, was a new understanding of how the UGB affects
“every single solitary aspect of the way we live . . . [including] traffic, education,
taxes, our desires about housing and architecture.” Id.
173 METRO, THE NATURE OF 2040:  THE REGION’S 50-YEAR PLAN FOR MANAG-
ING GROWTH (2000), available at  http://www.metro-region.org/library_docs/land_
use/2040history.pdf.
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their plans comport with Metro’s framework.174  Though its char-
ter seems to grant Metro this authority, the question still arises:
if a city within Metro’s district disagrees with the plan, can Metro
require the city to comply?  The next section addresses the an-
swer to this question, courtesy of the Oregon Court of Appeals.
B. The Court’s Interpretation of Metro’s Home Rule Powers
In 2005, the Oregon Court of Appeals answered that question
affirmatively in City of Sandy v. Metro ,175 holding that Metro has
the power to require local governments to adopt specific provi-
sions.176  In this appeal from a Land Use Board of Appeals deci-
sion, Hillsboro disputed Metro’s designation of a site that in
effect required Hillsboro to restrict commercial uses to keep land
available for industrial development.177  Hillsboro argued that
Metro, by mandating geographically and textually specific local
legislation, exceeded its jurisdictional authority—in other words,
Metro’s provisions were so specific that they established an un-
constitutional mandate.178
The court found that Metro’s powers were conferred by statute
and the constitution and therefore Metro’s enactment fit within
its authority.179  Although Metro required Hillsboro to designate
industrial zones, Hillsboro still had the freedom to choose the
locations of these zones.180  In its ruling, the court analogized to
its reasoning in La Grande :  just as general state laws prevail
over conflicting local rules unless the state laws interfere with a
locality’s ability to choose its political form, Metro’s provision re-
garding industrial zones prevailed because it did not interfere
with Hillsboro’s political form.181  While the Sandy  opinion ac-
knowledged Metro’s home rule authority over cities within its
174 Metro Charter, supra  note 155, § 5(2)(c), (e).  In effect, a three-tier system is
formed by the LCDC providing goals for Metro, which in turn provides goals for
each member district. See supra  note 129 and accompanying text.
175 200 Or. App. 481, 115 P.3d 960 (2005).
176 Id.  at 494, 115 P.3d at 967.
177 Id.  at 486, 115 P.3d at 963.
178 Id.  at 492-93, 115 P.3d at 966; Aoki, supra  note 128, at 431.
179 Sandy , 200 Or. App. at 494-96, 115 P.3d at 967-68.
180 See id.  at 495-96, 115 P.3d at 968.
181 Id.  at 495-96, 115 P.3d at 967-68 (citing City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees
Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204 (1978)).  Further, in his concurrence, Judge
Schuman reiterated that state substantive law is superior to regional rules, citing the
rule in La Grande  that “[t]he state has presumptive and plenary authority in matters
of ‘substantive social, economic, or other regulatory policy’ including land use regu-
lation, and to the extent that cities have independent authority, it is conferred on
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district, the specter of La Grande  loomed with reminders that
state substantive law prevails over Metro.  This pertinent re-
minder became much more compelling for Metro when Oregon
voters passed Measure 37, a coup de grace for critics of Oregon’s
land use system.
As mentioned above, Oregon’s land use system employs a
“two-tier” setup in which the state and LCDC set broad goals but
grant localities a degree of autonomy in planning, implementa-
tion, governance, and oversight.182  Although successful for con-
trolling growth, this system also fuels the privatist movement,
which sees the two-tier system as one of overregulation and
trampled individual rights.  A UGB by its nature creates dispa-
rate land values on either side of the line.  One can imagine a
property owner within a quickly growing portion of the UGB
platting out her land, selling the plats to developers, and counting
her proceeds as a subdivision rises.  Her neighbor, looking in
from designated farmland outside the UGB, can only plant,183
sell his land at a fraction of what his neighbor on the other side of
the UGB received, or do nothing.  Based on scenarios like this, it
is not surprising that many private landowners on the less viable
side of the UGB, watching neighbors cash in on rapidly inflating
land values, feel like they are taking an unreasonable and unfair
financial hit for the greater good.  This privatist frustration came
to a head in the form of Measure 37.
C. Enter Kong:  Measure 37184
In November 2004, Oregon voters passed Measure 37 with
sixty-one percent of the vote.185  In essence, Measure 37 provides
that if a public entity enacts or enforces a land use regulation that
results in a loss of land value, the entity must compensate the
owner for the difference in value or waive the land use restric-
tion.186  While proponents promoted the initiative as a system
them by the state charter.” Id.  at 499, 115 P.3d at 970 (Schuman, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
182 See supra  note 129 and accompanying text. R
183 That is, he can plant if the land actually supports crops. See  Hagans, supra
note 14. R
184 Measure 37 is codified at ORS 197.352 (2005).  See the Appendix, infra,  for
the full text.
185 Or. Sec’y of State Election Div., supra note 16; Election 2004:  How Oregon
Voted , OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 4, 2004, at D6.
186 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(1); see infra  Appendix.  The measure provides for
exclusions where the regulation is required for prohibiting nuisances, ensuring pub-
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creating just compensation for ordinary folks when government
regulation constitutes a taking of private property,187 the actual
language creates civil claims when a land use restriction causes
any  loss in property value.188  Further, the measure does not pro-
vide a source for funds from which the public body can compen-
sate; in effect, the government has no real choice but to waive a
challenged land use restriction.189
In October 2005, a judge on the Marion County Circuit Court
ruled Measure 37 unconstitutional;190 however, the Oregon Su-
preme Court quickly reversed.191  Writing for a unanimous
bench, Chief Justice Paul De Muniz declared the measure consti-
tutional on all grounds, including two additional challenges that
the plaintiffs renewed on review.192  In his conclusion, De Muniz
clarified the court’s role, explaining that
lic health or safety, complying with federal law, prohibiting nude dancing or selling
pornography, or where the regulation was enacted prior to the landowner’s (or a
family member’s) acquisition.  § 197.352(3); see infra  Appendix.
187 Measure 37 proponents garnered support through the stories of family farm-
ers, such as elderly widow Dorothy English.  In radio ads, English plaintively ex-
plained how land use laws prevented her from dividing and passing on to her
children the forty acres she had owned for over fifty years.  Blaine Harden, Anti-
Sprawl Laws, Property Rights Collide in Oregon , WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2005, at A1.
“I’m 91 years old, my husband is dead and I don’t know how much longer I can
fight,” she said. Id.  According to a Washington Post  investigation of state records,
however, most of the money backing the measure came from timber companies and
real estate interests likely to profit when large tracts of land are freed for develop-
ment. Id.
188 Aoki, supra  note 128, at 434.
189 Id.  at 435.  Notably, however, in August 2005, Metro’s Measure 37 task force
recommended a plan requiring property owners in rural areas tapped for urban
growth to give the government part of their profits from property sales to pay for
Measure 37 claims in areas where development is undesirable.  Laura Oppenheimer,
Idea Shines Light on M37 Gloom , OREGONIAN (Portland), Aug. 22, 2005, at B1.
These funds also would finance building infrastructure (such as roads and sewers) in
“desirable” areas. Id.
190 MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., Civil No. 05C10444 (Cir. Ct. Marion
County, Or., Oct 14, 2005), available at  http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/
Measure37.pdf.  The trial court held that Measure 37 violated the following Oregon
Constitution sections:  (1) article IV, section 1(1), (2)(a), and (3)(a) (granting ple-
nary power to the legislature); (2) article I, section 20 (equal privileges and immuni-
ties clause); (3) article I, section 22 (prohibiting certain suspensions of laws); and (4)
article III, section 1 (separation of powers clause). Id.  at 23.  The trial court also
concluded that Measure 37 violated the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id.  at 21-22.
191 MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 340 Or. 117, 130 P.3d 308 (2006).
192 Id.  at 125, 141, 130 P.3d at 313-14, 322.  Plaintiffs renewed challenges to Mea-
sure 37’s constitutionality under (1) article IV, section 24 (sovereign immunity
waiver clause) and (2) article III, section 1 (separation of powers clause). Id. at 125,
130 P.3d at 313-14.
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[w]hether Measure 37 as a policy choice is wise or foolish, far-
sighted or blind, is beyond this court’s purview.  Our only
function in any case involving a constitutional challenge to an
initiative measure is to ensure that the measure does not con-
travene any pertinent, applicable constitutional provisions.
Here, we conclude that no such provisions have been
contravened.193
Although the plaintiffs did not raise—nor did the court ex-
plore—whether Measure 37 comported with article XI, section 2,
the court’s analysis of whether Measure 37 intruded on the ple-
nary power to legislate provides some indication of how the court
would look at such a challenge.  In interpreting the plenary
power clauses of the Oregon Constitution,194 the court deter-
mined that the people and the legislature share the power to pro-
pose, enact, and reject laws.195  Any limits on legislative power
had to be grounded, either expressly or impliedly, within the pro-
visions of the constitution.196  In light of this principle, De Muniz
wrote:
[P]laintiffs cite no constitutional provision—and we know of
none—that either expressly or impliedly limits the power of
the Legislative Assembly or the people, exercising their initia-
tive power, to authorize state or local entities to decide, in ac-
cordance with Measure 37, whether to pay just compensation
or to modify, remove, or not apply certain land use
regulations.
. . . Nothing in Measure 37 forbids the Legislative Assembly
or the people from enacting new land use statutes, from re-
pealing all land use statutes, or from amending or repealing
Measure 37 itself.  Simply stated, Measure 37 is an exercise  of
the plenary power, not a limitation  on it.197
In other words, because Measure 37 does not limit the legisla-
ture’s ability to make laws, it does not violate the plenary power
provision.  Under this reasoning and considering the rule in La
Grande , the question of whether Measure 37 limits Metro’s
home rule powers under article XI probably would prompt a sim-
ilar answer—that is, because Measure 37 is a substantive, not
procedural, state law and does not impact Metro’s political struc-
ture, the measure is constitutional under the current state of
home rule in Oregon.  Should Metro persuade the court to revisit
193 Id.  at 141, 130 P.3d at 322.
194 OR. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(1), (2)(a), (3)(a).
195 MacPherson , 340 Or. at 126-28, 130 P.3d at 314-15.
196 Id.  at 127, 130 P.3d at 314.
197 Id. at 128, 130 P.3d at 315.
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La Grande , however, it may have a compelling argument that its
land use planning is precisely the sort of power the home rule
amendment drafters hoped to grant local governments.
IV
“GORILLA” TACTICS:  METRO’S BEST RESPONSE TO
MEASURE 37
In response to Measure 37, Metro revised its code and created
procedures for responding to Measure 37 claims.198  Overall, the
code encourages compliance with filing procedures by ensuring
that compliant claims get addressed first.199  Further, section
2.21.050 sets up rules for hearings and requires that within 180
days of when a claim is filed, Metro will determine whether the
claim qualifies under Measure 37’s provisions.200  If the claim
qualifies, Metro will either provide relief in the form of compen-
sation or waiver, or resolve to modify or remove the land use
restriction at issue.201  Section 2.21.070 of the code carves out
some leeway for Metro, allowing it to place any conditions on its
action, such as conservation easements and deed restrictions as
Metro deems “appropriate to achieve purposes of this chap-
ter.”202  Moreover, if Metro grants a waiver, the claimant cannot
bring any further Measure 37 claims involving the subject
property.203
The preceding paragraph provides a descriptive account of
Metro’s response to Measure 37.  However, the real question is
normative:  what should  Metro’s response be as a home rule en-
tity?  As the law currently stands, Measure 37 likely will remain
an irresistible—i.e., constitutionally sound—force for Metro in
light of MacPherson  and so long as La Grande  continues to be
controlling.  However, just as the courts’ interpretation of Ore-
gon’s home rule amendment dramatically shifted over its first
ninety-odd years, the time may be ripe for the court to reexamine
La Grande  and revive local governmental autonomy under home
rule.
As explained above, like other states with constitutional home
198 PORTLAND METRO. SERV. DIST., OR., METRO CODE ch. 2.21 (2006), available
at http://www.metro-region.org/library_docs/about/chap221.pdf.
199 Id.  § 2.21.050.
200 Id.
201 Id. § 2.21.060.
202 Id.  § 2.21.070.
203 Id.
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rule amendments, Oregon’s imperio in imperium  home rule
power, by definition, creates a state within a state and grants lo-
cal government power to initiate its own legislation, while giving
ordinances regulating local matters immunity from state interfer-
ence.204  This principle is inherent in U’Ren and the other fram-
ers’ intent, especially in light of the issues that arose from other
states’ charters at the time.  As Justice Tongue wrote in his La
Grande  dissent:
[I]t is significant that in Oregon the “home rule” amendments
provided (in Art XI, § 2) not only that the voters of every city
were granted the power to enact and amend their city charters
“subject to the Constitution and criminal  laws of the State of
Oregon” but also provided (in Art IV, § 1(a), now § 1(5)) that
the initiative and referendum powers as previously “reserved”
to the people were extended to the voters of every city “as
to all local, special and municipal legislation of every
character .”205
In other words, the specific changes the drafters made from other
states’ amendments strongly suggest that the framers intended a
broader construction of local autonomy than other states had
sanctioned and the La Grande  majority endorsed.  In effect, La
Grande  paralyzed localities by narrowly construing local powers
to purely procedural matters and thus rendered home rule
largely meaningless, particularly for those who believe that sub-
stantive urban planning is best left to local governments.
The solution, however, is not to adopt wholesale Tongue’s rea-
soning in his La Grande  dissent.  Although Tongue forcefully
elucidated the many weaknesses in the La Grande  majority’s
holding, his call to look to the court as an arbitrator, as Profes-
sors Sandalow and Vanlandingham prescribed at the time, would
not place Metro or other local governments in a significantly bet-
ter position than they are under La Grande .  Over decades, Ore-
gon courts swung back and forth between curtailing and
enriching local autonomy under home rule; should the court
overrule La Grande  and readopt Heinig , Metro and other locali-
ties may trade greatly limited home rule powers for uncertain
powers constantly subject to litigation and invalidation by Ore-
gon courts.
To prevent this potential uncertainty and increased caseload,
204 See supra  text accompanying notes 29-34. R
205 City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 162, 576 P.2d
1204, 1218 (1978) (Tongue, J., dissenting).
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the court should consider a position partway between Heinig  and
La Grande .  This position would partially reimplement Heinig ’s
“predominant interests” tests by granting broad home rule initia-
tive to specific substantive areas of law that have a predomi-
nantly local interest and accordingly benefit most from local
decision-making.  Metro’s responsibilities for maintaining the
UGB and designating its accompanying zoning and development
provisions are substantive areas of law that primarily concern the
locality.  Accordingly, the court should grant Metro and other
UGB-managing localities autonomy in their UGB management
capacities.  As a guide for the court in implementing this change,
Professor David Barron provides a model for local autonomy in
urban planning and explains why local antisprawl measures
should enjoy greater home rule initiative.206
Barron’s proposal begins with a model home rule provision ad-
vocated in the 1950s by the American Municipal Association in
response to the influx of suburbanization in American metropoli-
tan areas after World War II.207  The provision presented a com-
pelling balance of home rule initiative and immunity.  In short,
the provision permitted localities to act on an array of issues re-
gardless of whether they were of local interest; however, the state
retained unlimited preemption powers.208  This framework pur-
ported to empower local governments to address the bad effects
of suburbanization while retaining for the state power to “fash-
ion the most sensible rules for the incorporation of new munici-
palities or the alteration of local boundaries, whether through
annexation, consolidation, or dissolution.”209
Like the American Municipal Association model, Barron pro-
poses broadening the scope of home rule initiative beyond a local
versus state interest framework to specifically grant localities au-
tonomy to enact substantive laws to combat sprawl.210  Barron’s
proposal, however, abrogates state preemption power; he argues
206 Barron, supra note 20, at 2364-65.  It is worth noting that Barron’s article fo- R
cuses more on changes to home rule by constitutional amendments than by common
law, as this Comment prescribes.  Accordingly, Metro may have another potential
tool in its back pocket to protect the UGB:  persuading Oregon voters to amend the
constitutional home rule provision.  Although this option falls outside of this Com-
ment’s scope, Barron’s reasoning and proposal provide a compelling model for
Metro and the court should Metro persuade it to reconsider La Grande .
207 Id.  at 2325-26.
208 Id.  at 2326.
209 Id. at 2327
210 Id.  at 2364-65.
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this change is necessary in light of evidence that “the state often
contributes to sprawl through judicial determinations that state
statutes—such as zoning enabling acts—preempt certain local
powers of initiative that might promote a more compact pattern
of development.”211  Barron argues that clearly stated require-
ments for state preemption “would instruct courts to construe
narrowly the scope of state preemption of local actions that serve
the broad goals of anti-sprawl reform—namely, those that pro-
duce affordable housing, combat housing discrimination, or di-
rect development toward already developed areas.”212
Dispensing limitations based on whether the concern is state-
wide or local, Barron argues, and replacing them with general
grants of power would provide a useful avenue for those closest
to sprawl issues to develop creative solutions.213  In this scenario,
Barron further asserts, states also should curb their preemption
power in order to allow localities to fully realize the substantive
purposes that home rule authority confers and provide some as-
surance that localities’ actions are unlikely to be later litigated or
invalidated.214  In support of his proposal, Baron writes that the
early home rulers sought limits to local power
to establish preconditions for cities themselves to respond
more effectively to the problems they faced than had been
possible under the prior legal structure.  Thus, the limits that
the early home rulers favored—and all of them favored some
limits—were always accompanied by requests for the removal
of prohibitions on the exercise of certain legal powers. . . . The
purpose of reform, therefore, was not to disengage local
power.  It was . . . to give “new life” through a new package of
grants and limitations that would transform local power.215
Should Oregon adopt Barron’s proposal for redefining home
rule, Metro stands to benefit in several ways.  Obviously, Bar-
ron’s proposal provides more certainty for Metro in that it could
enforce its provisions without fear of state preemption.  Further,
by concurrently expanding home rule for the local governments
within Metro’s boundaries, Metro may see its UGB fortified.  As
Barron explains, Metro has an interest in maintaining housing
affordability within the UGB, because if housing becomes too
211 Id.  at 2365-66.
212 Id.  at 2366.
213 Id.  at 2365.
214 Id.  at 2366.
215 Id.  at 2368.
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expensive, political pressure to expand the UGB may become
substantial.216  A Metro survey revealed that none of the region’s
municipalities have enacted zoning measures requiring afforda-
ble housing because state law expressly prohibits local govern-
ments from enacting such measures.217  Accordingly, if localities
like Hillsboro received a broader grant of home rule, they could
arguably enact measures ensuring affordable housing, thus en-
hancing Metro’s ability to retain the UGB.
Just as Metro could benefit from localities enjoying greater au-
tonomy under a broader grant of home rule initiative, so might
the state benefit from Metro’s home rule power packing more
substantive punch.  As explained above, broad home rule initia-
tive leaves substantive decision-making to those most affected by
the consequences of local problems and solutions.  Barron and
Metro’s findings on how limited home rule chokes local efforts to
maintain affordable housing easily deflates the argument that a
grant of state preemption is necessary to prevent “white flight.”
On the contrary, it is precisely the lack  of home rule autonomy
that Portland-area localities can exercise that promulgates the
gulf between the wealthy and poor, the suburbs and the city.  In
essence, a broader grant of urban planning power through home
rule can allow Metro to address these local problems with more
individualized solutions while freeing the state to focus on the
larger issues impacting the state as a whole.
Finally, expanded home rule initiative powers granted to
Metro and localities may also benefit Measure 37’s proponents.
Granting Metro more autonomy allows it to devise local solu-
tions and experiment with creative compromises for those un-
happy with its land use designations and the UGB.  This
increased local home rule autonomy can go a long way in keep-
ing housing affordable within the UGB.  As housing costs are
kept lower, land values within the UGB become less inflated,
thus blurring the line dividing those inside and outside the UGB
and making the need for Measure 37 claims less acute.  Rather
than bludgeon the UGB with the crude tool that is Measure 37, a
broad grant of home rule can equip Metro with a surgeon’s knife
to carve out individualized solutions and more equitably disburse
the benefits and burdens of specific land use provisions.
216 Id.  at 2382.
217 Id.
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CONCLUSION
As Chief Justice De Muniz wrote in MacPherson , “Whether
Measure 37 as a policy choice is wise or foolish, farsighted or
blind, is beyond this court’s purview.”218  To a degree, the same
sentiment goes for this Comment.  As a substantive matter, one
may be hard-pressed to deny any Oregon resident—especially
small family farmers and individual landowners—the maximum
value their land could realize.  However, one also can easily see
how a broad, blunt instrument like Measure 37 could, like King
Kong, sweep away the Portland region’s meticulously scrutinized
urban plan.  Whether Measure 37 will truly eviscerate Metro’s
UGB or simply represent another element in Metro’s “experi-
ment” remains the topic of debate and discussion in legal, urban
planning, and local government circles.  What is certain about
Measure 37 is its potential to reinvigorate the debate on what
exactly home rule means in Oregon and, more specifically, how
Metro should define its powers under Oregon’s home rule provi-
sion.  As Professor Vanlandingham wrote, home rule is not as-
sured by a constitutional amendment but by localities
aggressively seeking to “protect and advance their proper inter-
ests.”219  By arguing for another adjustment in the long line of
shifts concerning what home rule means in Oregon, Metro may
be able to charm the eponymous primate voters escorted to its
front door.
218 MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 340 Or. 117, 141, 130 P.3d 308, 322
(2006).
219 Vanlandingham, supra  note 1, at 314.
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF MEASURE 37 (CURRENTLY ORS 197.352)
The following provisions are added to and made a part of ORS
chapter 197:
(1) If a public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regula-
tion or enforces a land use regulation enacted prior to December
2, 2004, that restricts the use of private real property or any inter-
est therein and has the effect of reducing the fair market value of
the property, or any interest therein, then the owner of the prop-
erty shall be paid just compensation.
(2) Just compensation shall be equal to the reduction in the
fair market value of the affected property interest resulting from
enactment or enforcement of the land use regulation as of the
date the owner makes written demand for compensation under
this section.
(3) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to land use
regulations:
(A) Restricting or prohibiting activities commonly and histori-
cally recognized as public nuisances under common law. This
subsection shall be construed narrowly in favor of a finding of
compensation under this section;
(B) Restricting or prohibiting activities for the protection of
public health and safety, such as fire and building codes, health
and sanitation regulations, solid or hazardous waste regulations,
and pollution control regulations;
(C) To the extent the land use regulation is required to comply
with federal law;
(D) Restricting or prohibiting the use of a property for the
purpose of selling pornography or performing nude dancing.
Nothing in this subsection, however, is intended to affect or alter
rights provided by the Oregon or United States Constitutions; or
(E) Enacted prior to the date of acquisition of the property by
the owner or a family member of the owner who owned the sub-
ject property prior to acquisition or inheritance by the owner,
whichever occurred first.
(4) Just compensation under subsection (1) of this section shall
be due the owner of the property if the land use regulation con-
tinues to be enforced against the property 180 days after the
owner of the property makes written demand for compensation
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 37  9-APR-07 14:34
2006] Charming the Eight-Hundred-Pound Gorilla 851
under this section to the public entity enacting or enforcing the
land use regulation.
(5) For claims arising from land use regulations enacted prior
to December 2, 2004, written demand for compensation under
subsection (4) shall be made within two years of December 2,
2004, or the date the public entity applies the land use regulation
as an approval criteria to an application submitted by the owner
of the property, whichever is later.  For claims arising from land
use regulations enacted after December 2, 2004, written demand
for compensation under subsection (4) shall be made within two
years of the enactment of the land use regulation, or the date the
owner of the property submits a land use application in which the
land use regulation is an approval criteria, whichever is later.
(6) If a land use regulation continues to apply to the subject
property more than 180 days after the present owner of the prop-
erty has made written demand for compensation under this sec-
tion, the present owner of the property, or any interest therein,
shall have a cause of action for compensation under this section
in the circuit court in which the real property is located, and the
present owner of the real property shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney fees, expenses, costs, and other disbursements reason-
ably incurred to collect the compensation.
(7) A metropolitan service district, city, or county, or state
agency may adopt or apply procedures for the processing of
claims under this section, but in no event shall these procedures
act as a prerequisite to the filing of a compensation claim under
subsection (6) of this section, nor shall the failure of an owner of
property to file an application for a land use permit with the local
government serve as grounds for dismissal, abatement, or delay
of a compensation claim under subsection (6) of this section.
(8) Notwithstanding any other state statute or the availability
of funds under subsection (10) of this section, in lieu of payment
of just compensation under this section, the governing body re-
sponsible for enacting the land use regulation may modify, re-
move, or not to apply the land use regulation or land use
regulations to allow the owner to use the property for a use per-
mitted at the time the owner acquired the property.
(9) A decision by a governing body under this section shall not
be considered a land use decision as defined in ORS 197.015(10).
(10) Claims made under this section shall be paid from funds,
if any, specifically allocated by the legislature, city, county, or
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metropolitan service district for payment of claims under this sec-
tion.  Notwithstanding the availability of funds under this subsec-
tion, a metropolitan service district, city, county, or state agency
shall have discretion to use available funds to pay claims or to
modify, remove, or not apply a land use regulation or land use
regulations pursuant to subsection (6) of this section.  If a claim
has not been paid within two years from the date on which it
accrues, the owner shall be allowed to use the property as per-
mitted at the time the owner acquired the property.
(11) Definitions—for purposes of this section:
(A) “Family member” shall include the wife, husband, son,
daughter, mother, father, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-
law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law,
aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, stepparent, stepchild, grandparent, or
grandchild of the owner of the property, an estate of any of the
foregoing family members, or a legal entity owned by any one or
combination of these family members or the owner of the
property.
(B) “Land use regulation” shall include:
(i) Any statute regulating the use of land or any interest
therein;
(ii) Administrative rules and goals of the Land Conservation
and Development Commission;
(iii) Local government comprehensive plans, zoning ordi-
nances, land division ordinances, and transportation ordinances;
(iv) Metropolitan service district regional framework plans,
functional plans, planning goals and objectives; and
(v) Statutes and administrative rules regulating farming and
forest practices.
(C) “Owner” is the present owner of the property, or any in-
terest therein.
(D) “Public entity” shall include the state, a metropolitan ser-
vice district, a city, or a county.
(12) The remedy created by this section is in addition to any
other remedy under the Oregon or United States Constitutions,
and is not intended to modify or replace any other remedy.
(13) If any portion or portions of this section are declared in-
valid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining portions
of this section shall remain in full force and effect.
